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The Turing test aimed to recognize the behavior of a human from that of a computer algorithm. Such chal-
lenge is more relevant than ever in today’s social media context, where limited attention and technology
constrain the expressive power of humans, while incentives abound to develop software agents mimicking
humans. These social bots interact, often unnoticed, with real people in social media ecosystems, but their
abundance is uncertain. While many bots are benign, one can design harmful bots with the goals of per-
suading, smearing, or deceiving. Here we discuss the characteristics of modern, sophisticated social bots,
and how their presence can endanger online ecosystems and our society. We then review current efforts
to detect social bots on Twitter. Features related to content, network, sentiment, and temporal patterns of
activity are imitated by bots but at the same time can help discriminate synthetic behaviors from human
ones, yielding signatures of engineered social tampering.
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The rise of the machines
Bots (short for software robots) have been around since the early days of computers:
one compelling example is that of chatbots, algorithms designed to hold a conversation
with a human, as envisioned by Alan Turing in the 1950s [Turing 1950]. The dream
of designing a computer algorithm that passes the Turing test has driven artificial
intelligence research for decades, as witnessed by initiatives like the Loebner Prize,
awarding progress in natural language processing.1 Many things have changed since
the early days of AI, when bots like Joseph Weizenbaum’s ELIZA [Weizenbaum 1966],
mimicking a Rogerian psychotherapist, were developed as demonstrations or for de-
light.
Today, social media ecosystems populated by hundreds of millions of individuals
present real incentives —including economic and political ones— to design algorithms
that exhibit human-like behavior. Such ecosystems also raise the bar of the challenge,
as they introduce new dimensions to emulate in addition to content, including the so-
cial network, temporal activity, diffusion patterns and sentiment expression. A social
bot is a computer algorithm that automatically produces content and interacts with
1www.loebner.net/Prizef/loebner-prize.html
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humans on social media, trying to emulate and possibly alter their behavior. Social
bots have been known to inhabit social media platforms for a few years [Lee et al.
2011; Boshmaf et al. 2013].
Engineered social tampering
What are the intentions of social bots? Some of them are benign and, in principle, in-
nocuous or even helpful: this category includes bots that automatically aggregate con-
tent from various sources, like simple news feeds. Automatic responders to inquiries
are increasingly adopted by brands and companies for customer care. Although this
type of bots are designed to provide a useful service, they can sometimes be harm-
ful, for example when they contribute to the spread of unverified information or ru-
mors. Analysis of Twitter posts around the Boston marathon bombing revealed that
social media can play an important role in the early recognition and characterization
of emergency events [Cassa et al. 2013]. But false accusations also circulated widely
on Twitter in the aftermath of the attack, mostly due to bots automatically retweeting
posts without verifying the facts or checking the credibility of the source [Gupta et al.
2013].
With every new technology comes abuse, and social media are no exception. A sec-
ond category of social bots includes malicious entities designed specifically with the
purpose to harm. These bots mislead, exploit, and manipulate social media discourse
with rumors, spam, malware, misinformation, slander, or even just noise. This may
result in several levels of damage to society. For example, bots may artificially inflate
support for a political candidate [Ratkiewicz et al. 2011a]; such activity could endan-
ger democracy by influencing the outcome of elections. In fact, these kinds of abuse
have already been observed: during the 2010 U.S. midterm elections, social bots were
employed to support some candidates and smear their opponents, injecting thousands
of tweets pointing to websites with fake news [Ratkiewicz et al. 2011a]. A similar case
was reported around the Massachusetts special election of 2010 [Metaxas and Musta-
faraj 2012]. Campaigns of this type are sometimes referred to as astroturf or Twitter
bombs. The problem is not just in establishing the veracity of the information being
promoted — this was an issue before the rise of social bots, and remains beyond the
reach of algorithmic approaches. The novel challenge brought by bots is the fact that
they can give the false impression that some piece of information, regardless of its ac-
curacy, is highly popular and endorsed by many, exerting an influence against which
we haven’t yet developed antibodies. Our vulnerability makes it possible for a bot to ac-
quire significant influence, even unintentionally [Aiello et al. 2012]. Sophisticated bots
can generate personas that appear as credible followers, and thus are harder for both
people and filtering algorithms to detect. They make for valuable entities on the fake
follower market, and allegations of acquisition of fake followers have touched several
prominent political figures in the US and worldwide.
More examples of the potential dangers brought by social bots are increasingly re-
ported by journalists, analysts, and researchers. These include the unwarranted con-
sequences that the widespread diffusion of bots may have on the stability of markets.
There have been claims that Twitter signals can be leveraged to predict the stock mar-
ket [Bollen et al. 2011], and there is an increasing amount of evidence showing that
market operators pay attention and react promptly to information from social media.
On April 23, 2013, for example, the Syrian Electronic Army hacked the Twitter ac-
count of the Associate Press and posted a false rumor about a terror attack on the
White House in which President Obama was allegedly injured. This provoked an im-
mediate crash in the stock market. On May 6, 2010 a flash crash occurred in the U.S.
stock market, when the Dow Jones plunged over 1,000 points (about 9%) within min-
utes —the biggest one-day point decline in history. After a 5-month long investigation,
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the role of high-frequency trading bots became obvious, but it yet remains unclear
whether these bots had access to information from the social Web [Hwang et al. 2012].
The combination of social bots with an increasing reliance on automatic trading sys-
tems that, at least partially, exploit information from social media, is ripe with risks.
Bots can amplify the visibility of misleading information, while automatic trading sys-
tem lack fact-checking capabilities. A recent orchestrated bot campaign successfully
created the appearance of a sustained discussion about a tech company called Cynk.
Automatic trading algorithms picked up this conversation and started trading heavily
in the company’s stocks. This resulted in a 200-fold increase in market value, bringing
the company’s worth to 5 billion dollars.2 By the time analysts recognized the orches-
tration behind this operation and stock trading was suspended, the losses were real.
The bot effect
These anecdotes illustrate the consequences that tampering with the social Web may
have for our increasingly interconnected society. In addition to potentially endanger-
ing democracy, causing panic during emergencies, and affecting the stock market, so-
cial bots can harm our society in even subtler ways. A recent study demonstrated the
vulnerability of social media users to a social botnet designed to expose private infor-
mation, like phone numbers and addresses [Boshmaf et al. 2013]. This kind of vul-
nerability can be exploited by cybercrime and cause the erosion of trust in social me-
dia [Hwang et al. 2012]. Bots can also hinder the advancement of public policy by creat-
ing the impression of a grassroots movement of contrarians, or contribute to the strong
polarization of political discussion observed in social media [Conover et al. 2011]. They
can alter the perception of social media influence, artificially enlarging the audience of
some people [Edwards et al. 2014], or they can ruin the reputation of a company, for
commercial or political purposes [Messias et al. 2013]. A recent study demonstrated
that emotions are contagious on social media [Kramer et al. 2014]: elusive bots could
easily infiltrate a population of unaware humans and manipulate them to affect their
perception of reality, with unpredictable results. Indirect social and economic effects of
social bot activity include the alteration of social media analytics, adopted for various
purposes such as TV ratings,3 expert finding [Wu et al. 2013], and scientific impact
measurement.4
Act like a human, think like a bot
One of the greatest challenges for bot detection in social media is in understanding
what modern social bots can do [Boshmaf et al. 2012]. Early bots mainly performed
one type of activity: posting content automatically. These bots were as naive as easy
to spot by trivial detection strategies, such as focusing on high volume of content gen-
eration. In 2011, James Caverlee’s team at Texas A&M University implemented a
honeypot trap that managed to detect thousands of social bots [Lee et al. 2011]. The
idea was simple and effective: the team created a few Twitter accounts (bots) whose
role was solely to create nonsensical tweets with gibberish content, in which no human
would ever be interested. However, these accounts attracted many followers. Further
inspection confirmed that the suspicious followers were indeed social bots trying to
grow their social circles by blindly following random accounts.
2The Curious Case of Cynk, an Abandoned Tech Company Now Worth $5 Billion — mashable.com/2014/07/
10/cynk
3Nielsen’s New Twitter TV Ratings Are a Total Scam. Here’s Why. — defamer.gawker.com/
nielsens-new-twitter-tv-ratings-are-a-total-scam-here-1442214842
4altmetrics: a manifesto — altmetrics.org/manifesto/
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In recent years, Twitter bots have become increasingly sophisticated, making their
detection more difficult. The boundary between human-like and bot-like behavior is
now fuzzier. For example, social bots can search the Web for information and media to
fill their profiles, and post collected material at predetermined times, emulating the
human temporal signature of content production and consumption —including circa-
dian patterns of daily activity and temporal spikes of information generation [Golder
and Macy 2011]. They can even engage in more complex types of interactions, such
as entertaining conversations with other people, commenting on their posts, and an-
swering their questions [Hwang et al. 2012]. Some bots specifically aim to achieve
greater influence by gathering new followers and expanding their social circles; they
can search the social network for popular and influential people and follow them or
capture their attention by sending them inquiries, in the hope to be noticed [Aiello
et al. 2012]. To acquire visibility, they can infiltrate popular discussions, generating
topically-appropriate —and even potentially interesting— content, by identifying rele-
vant keywords and searching online for information fitting that conversation [Freitas
et al. 2014]. After the appropriate content is identified, the bots can automatically pro-
duce responses through natural language algorithms, possibly including references to
media or links pointing to external resources. Other bots aim at tampering with the
identities of legitimate people: some are identity thieves, adopting slight variants of
real usernames, and stealing personal information such as pictures and links. Even
more advanced mechanisms can be employed; some social bots are able to “clone” the
behavior of legitimate users, by interacting with their friends and posting topically
coherent content with similar temporal patterns.
A taxonomy of social bot detection systems
For all the reasons outlined above, the computing community is engaging in the design
of advanced methods to automatically detect social bots, or to discriminate between
humans and bots. The strategies currently employed by social media services appear
inadequate to contrast this phenomenon and the efforts of the academic community in
this direction just started.
In the following, we propose a simple taxonomy that divides the approaches pro-
posed in literature into three classes: (i) bot detection systems based on social network
information; (ii) system based on crowd-sourcing and leveraging human intelligence;
(iii) machine learning methods based on the identification of highly-revealing features
that discriminate between bots and humans. Sometimes a hard categorization of a de-
tection strategy into one of these three categories is difficult, since some exhibit mixed
elements: we present also a section of methods that combine ideas from these three
main approaches.
Graph-based social bot detection
The challenge of social bot detection has been framed by various teams in an adver-
sarial setting [Alvisi et al. 2013]. One example of this framework is represented by
the Facebook Immune System [Stein et al. 2011]: an adversary may control multiple
social bots (often referred to as Sybils in this context) to impersonate different identi-
ties and launch an attack or infiltration. Proposed strategies to detect sybil accounts
often rely on examining the structure of a social graph. SybilRank [Cao et al. 2012]
for example assumes that sybil accounts exhibit a small number of links to legiti-
mate users, instead connecting mostly to other sybils, as they need a large number of
social ties to appear trustworthy. This feature is exploited to identify densely inter-
connected groups of sybils. One common strategy is to adopt off-the-shelf community
detection methods to reveal such tightly-knit local communities; however, the choice of
the community detection algorithm has proven to crucially affect the performance of
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the detection algorithms [Viswanath et al. 2011]. A wise attacker may counterfeit the
connectivity of the controlled sybil accounts so that to mimic the features of the com-
munity structure of the portion of the social network populated by legitimate accounts;
this strategy would make the attack invisible to methods solely relying on community
detection. To address this shortcoming, some detection systems, for example Sybil-
Rank, also employ the paradigm of innocent by association: an account interacting
with a legitimate user is considered itself legitimate. Souche [Xie et al. 2012] and Anti-
Reconnaissance [Paradise et al. 2014] also rely on the assumption that social network
structure alone separates legitimate users from bots. Unfortunately, the effectiveness
of such detection strategies is bound by the behavioral assumption that legitimate
users refuse to interact with unknown accounts. This was proven unrealistic by var-
ious experiments [Stringhini et al. 2010; Boshmaf et al. 2013; Elyashar et al. 2013]:
a large-scale social bot infiltration on Facebook showed that over 20% of legitimate
users accept friendship requests indiscriminately, and over 60% accept requests from
accounts with at least one contact in common [Boshmaf et al. 2013]. On other plat-
forms like Twitter and Tumblr, connecting and interacting with strangers is one of the
main features. In these circumstances, the innocent-by-association paradigm yields
high false positive rates, and these are the worst types of errors: a service provider
would rather fail to detect a social bot than inconvenience a real user with an erro-
neous account suspension. Some authors noted the limits of the assumption of finding
groups of social bots or legitimate users only: real platforms may contain many mixed
groups of legitimate users who fell prey of some bots [Alvisi et al. 2013], and sophisti-
cated bots may succeed in large-scale infiltrations making it impossible to detect them
solely from network structure information. This brought Alvisi et al. to recommend a
portfolio of complementary detection techniques, and the manual identification of le-
gitimate social network users to aid in the training of supervised learning algorithms.
Crowd-sourcing social bot detection
The possibility of human detection has been explored by Wang et al. [Wang et al.
2013b] who suggest the crowd-sourcing of social bot detection to legions of workers.
As a proof-of-concept, they created an Online Social Turing Test platform. The authors
assumed that bot detection is a simple task for humans, whose ability to evaluate
conversational nuances like sarcasm or persuasive language, or to observe emerging
patterns and anomalies, is yet unparalleled by machines. Using data from Facebook
and Renren (a popular Chinese online social network), the authors tested the effi-
cacy of humans, both expert annotators and workers hired online, at detecting social
bot accounts simply from the information on their profiles. The authors observed that
the detection rate for hired workers drops off over time, although it remains good
enough to be used in a majority voting protocol: the same profile is shown to multiple
workers and the opinion of the majority determines the final verdict. This strategy
exhibits a near-zero false positive rate, a very desirable feature for a service provider.
Three drawbacks undermine the feasibility of this approach: first, although the au-
thors make a general claim that crowd-sourcing the detection of social bots might
work if implemented since the early stage, this solution might not be cost-effective
for a platform with a large pre-existing user base, like Facebook and Twitter. Second,
to guarantee that a minimal number of human annotators can be employed to min-
imize costs, “expert” workers are still needed to accurately detect fake accounts, as
the “average” worker does not perform well individually. As a result, to reliably build
a ground-truth of annotated bots, large social network companies like Facebook and
Twitter are forced to hire teams of expert analysts [Stein et al. 2011], however such a
choice might not be suitable for small social networks in their early stages (an issue
at odds with the previous point). Finally, exposing personal information to external
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Table I. Classes of features employed by feature-based systems for social bot detection.
Class Description
Network Network features capture various dimensions of information diffusion patterns. Statistical features
can be extracted from networks based on retweets, mentions, and hashtag co-occurrence. Examples
include degree distribution, clustering coefficient, and centrality measures [Ratkiewicz et al. 2011b].
User User features are based on Twitter meta-data related to an account, including language, geographic
locations, and account creation time.
Friends Friend features include descriptive statistics relative to an account’s social contacts, such as median,
moments, and entropy of the distributions of their numbers of followers, followees, and posts.
Timing Timing features capture temporal patterns of content generation (tweets) and consumption
(retweets); examples include the signal similarity to a Poisson process [Ghosh et al. 2011], or the
average time between two consecutive posts.
Content Content features are based on linguistic cues computed through natural language processing, espe-
cially part-of-speech tagging; examples include the frequency of verbs, nouns, and adverbs in tweets.
Sentiment Sentiment features are built using general-purpose and Twitter-specific sentiment analysis algo-
rithms, including happiness, arousal-dominance-valence, and emotion scores [Golder and Macy 2011;
Bollen et al. 2011].
workers for validation raises privacy issue [Elovici et al. 2013]. While Twitter profiles
tend to be more public compared to Facebook, Twitter profiles also contain less infor-
mation than Facebook or Renren, thus giving a human annotator less ground to make
a judgment. Analysis by manual annotators of interactions and content produced by
a Syrian social botnet active in Twitter for 35 weeks suggests that some advanced
social bots may no longer aim at mimicking human behavior, but rather at misdirect-
ing attention to irrelevant information [Abokhodair et al. 2015]. Such smoke screening
strategies require high coordination among the bots. This observation is in line with
early findings on political campaigns orchestrated by social bots, which exhibited not
only peculiar network connectivity patterns but also enhanced levels of coordinated
behavior [Ratkiewicz et al. 2011a]. The idea of leveraging information about the syn-
chronization of account activities has been fueling many social bot detection systems:
frameworks like CopyCatch [Beutel et al. 2013], SynchroTrap [Cao et al. 2014], and
the Renren Sybil detector [Wang et al. 2013a; Yang et al. 2014] rely explicitly on the
identification of such coordinated behavior to identify social bots.
Feature-based social bot detection
The advantage of focusing on behavioral patterns is that these can be easily encoded
in features and adopted with machine learning techniques to learn the signature of
human-like and bot-like behaviors. This allows to later classify accounts according
to their observed behaviors. Different classes of features are commonly employed to
capture orthogonal dimensions of users’ behaviors, as summarized in Table I.
One example of feature-based system is represented by Bot or Not?. Released in
2014, it was the first social bot detection interface for Twitter to be made publicly avail-
able to raise awareness about the presence of social bots.5 Similarly to other feature-
based systems [Ratkiewicz et al. 2011b], Bot or Not? implements a detection algorithm
relying upon highly-predictive features which capture a variety of suspicious behaviors
and well separate social bots from humans. The system employs off-the-shelf super-
vised learning algorithms trained with examples of both humans and bots behaviors,
based on the Texas A&M dataset [Lee et al. 2011] that contains 15 thousand exam-
ples of each class and millions of tweets. Bot or Not? scores a detection accuracy above
95%,6 measured by AUROC via cross validation. In addition to the classification re-
5As of the time of this writing, Bot or Not? remains the only social bot detection system with a public-facing
interface: http://truthy.indiana.edu/botornot
6Detecting more recent and sophisticated social bots, compared to those in the 2011 dataset, may well yield
lower accuracy.
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Fig. 1. Common features used for social bot detection. (A) The network of hashtags co-occurring in the
tweets of a given user. (B) Various sentiment signals including emoticon, happiness and arousal-dominance-
valence scores. (C) The volume of content produced and consumed (tweeting and retweeting) over time.
sults, Bot or Not? provides a variety of interactive visualizations that provide insights
on the features exploited by the system (see Fig. 1 for examples).
Bots are continuously changing and evolving: the analysis of the highly-predictive
behaviors that feature-based detection systems can detect may reveal interesting pat-
terns and provide unique opportunities to understand how to discriminate between
bots and humans. User meta-data are considered among the most predictive features
and the most interpretable ones [Hwang et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2013b]: we can suggest
few rules of thumb to infer whether an account is likely a bot, by comparing its meta-
data with that of legitimate users (see Fig. 2). Further work, however, will be needed to
detect sophisticated strategies exhibiting a mixture of humans and social bots features
(sometimes referred to as cyborgs). Detecting these bots, or hacked accounts [Zangerle
and Specht 2014], is currently impossible for feature-based systems.
Combining multiple approaches
Alvisi et al. [Alvisi et al. 2013] recognized first the need of adopting complementary
detection techniques to effectively deal with sybil attacks in social networks. The Ren-
ren Sybil detector [Wang et al. 2013a; Yang et al. 2014] is an example of system that
explores multiple dimensions of users’ behaviors like activity and timing information.
Examination of ground-truth clickstream data shows that real users spend compara-
tively more time messaging and looking at other users’ contents (such as photos and
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Fig. 2. User behaviors that best discriminate social bots from humans. Social bots retweet more than hu-
mans and have longer user names, while they produce fewer tweets, replies and mentions, and they are
retweeted less than humans. Bot accounts also tend to be more recent.
videos), whereas Sybil accounts spend their time harvesting profiles and befriending
other accounts. Intuitively, social bot activities tend to be simpler in terms of variety
of behavior exhibited. By also identifying highly-predictive features such as invitation
frequency, outgoing requests accepted, and network clustering coefficient, Renren is
able to classify accounts into two categories: bot-like and human-like prototypical pro-
files [Yang et al. 2014]. Sybil accounts on Renren tend to collude and work together to
spread similar content: this additional signal, encoded as content and temporal simi-
larity, is used to detect colluding accounts. In some ways, the Renren approach [Wang
et al. 2013a; Yang et al. 2014] combines the best of network- and behavior-based con-
ceptualizations of Sybil detection. By achieving good results even utilizing only the last
100 click events for each user, the Renren system obviates to the need to store and an-
alyze the entire click history for every user. Once the parameters are tweaked against
ground truth, the algorithm can be seeded with a fixed number of known legitimate
accounts and then used for mostly unsupervised classification. The “Sybil until proven
otherwise” approach (the opposite of the innocent-by-association strategy) baked into
this framework does lend itself to detecting previously unknown methods of attack: the
authors recount the case of spambots embedding text in images to evade detection by
content analysis and URL blacklists. Other systems implementing mixed methods, like
CopyCatch [Beutel et al. 2013] and SynchroTrap [Cao et al. 2014], also score compar-
atively low false positive rates with respect to, for example, network-based methods.
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Master of puppets
If social bots are the puppets, additional efforts will have to be directed at finding
their “masters.” Governments7 and other entities with sufficient resources8 have been
alleged to use social bots to their advantage. Assuming the availability of effective
detection technologies, it will be crucial to reverse-engineer the observed social bot
strategies: who they target, how they generate content, when they take action, and
what topics they talk about. A systematic extrapolation of such information may en-
able identification of the puppet masters.
Efforts in the direction of studying platforms vulnerability already started. Some
researchers [Freitas et al. 2014], for example, reverse-engineer social bots reporting
alarming results: simple automated mechanisms that produce contents and boost fol-
lowers yield successful infiltration strategies and increase the social influence of the
bots. Others teams are creating bots themselves: Tim Hwang’s [Hwang et al. 2012] and
Sune Lehmann’s9 groups continuously challenge our understanding of what strate-
gies effective bots employ, and help quantify the susceptibility of people to their influ-
ence [Wagner et al. 2012; Wald et al. 2013]. Briscoe et al. [Briscoe et al. 2014] studied
the deceptive cues of language employed by influence bots. Tools like Bot or Not? have
been made available to the public to shed light on the presence of social bots online.
Yet many research questions remain open. For example, nobody knows exactly how
many social bots populate social media, or what share of content can be attributed to
bots —estimates vary wildly and we might have observed only the tip of the iceberg.
These are important questions for the research community to pursue, and initiatives
such as DARPA’s SMISC bot detection challenge, which took place in the Spring of
2015, can be effective catalysts of this emerging area of inquiry.
Bot behaviors are already quite sophisticated: they can build realistic social net-
works and produce credible content with human-like temporal patterns. As we build
better detection systems, we expect an arms race similar to that observed for spam in
the past [Heymann et al. 2007]. The need for training instances is an intrinsic limi-
tation of supervised learning in such a scenario; machine learning techniques such as
active learning might help respond to newer threats. The race will be over only when
the effectiveness of early detection will sufficiently increase the cost of deception.
The future of social media ecosystems might already point in the direction of en-
vironments where machine-machine interaction is the norm, and humans navigate a
world populated mostly by bots. We believe there is a need for bots and humans to be
able to recognize each other, to avoid bizarre, or even dangerous, situations based on
false assumptions of human interlocutors.10
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